The main aim of this paper is to revisit the curve fitting problem using the reliability of inductive inference as a primary criterion for the 'fittest' curve. Viewed from this perspective, it is argued that a crucial concern with the current framework for addressing the curve fitting problem is, on the one hand, the undue influence of the mathematical approximation perspective, and on the other, the insufficient attention paid to the statistical modeling aspects of the problem. Using goodness-of-fit as the primary criterion for 'best', the mathematical approximation perspective undermines the reliability of inference objective by giving rise to selection rules which pay insufficient attention to 'accounting for the regularities in the data'. A more appropriate framework is offered by the error-statistical approach, where (i) statistical adequacy provides the criterion for assessing when a curve captures the regularities in the data adequately, and (ii) the relevant error probabilities can be used to assess the reliability of inductive inference. Broadly speaking, the fittest curve (statistically adequate) is not determined by the smallness if its residuals, tempered by simplicity or other pragmatic criteria, but by the nonsystematic (e.g. white noise) nature of its residuals. The advocated error-statistical arguments are illustrated by comparing the Kepler and Ptolemaic models on empirical grounds.
1. Introduction. The curve fitting problem has a long history in both statistics and philosophy of science, and it's often viewed as a formal way to encapsulate the many dimensions and issues associated with inductive inference, including the underdetermination and the reliability of inference problems.
In its simplest form the curve fitting problem is how to choose among the multitude of ways to fit a curve through any scatter plot of data points †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Economics, Virginia Tech 3019 Pamplin Hall (0316), Blacksburg, VA 24061; e-mail: aris@vt.edu. ‡I am grateful to Deborah Mayo and Clark Glymour for many valuable suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of the paper; estimating the Ptolemaic model was the result of Glymour's prompting and encouragement. in a way that would capture the 'regularities' in {(x , y ), k p 1, . . . , n} k k the data adequately. Since there is an infinity of possible curves (models) that can be thought to be 'consistent with any data', the crucial problem is what criteria to use to direct the choice from among the wealth of possible curves. Establishing high goodness-of-fit between the data and a curve is obviously far too easy to achieve. The crucial question is: Which among the variety of rules for winnowing down the selection should be followed in order to arrive at reliable inductive inferences? Philosophers have despaired of solving this problem via any purely a priori, logical means, and appeals to pragmatic criteria, such as simplicity, proved highly equivocal (Salmon 1967; Glymour 1981; Skyrms 2000) .
As philosophers of science increasingly appealed to formal methods used in scientific practice, a new avenue for addressing this thorny problem was opened. Given a class of models, one can use a formal model selection procedure, such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and related procedures based on the likelihood function, to select a fittest model by trading goodness-of-fit against simplicity (see Forster and Sober 1994 and Kieseppa 1997, inter alia) . The appeal of such automatic selection procedures is enticing because it provides a formal and objective way to choose among the multitude of possible curves (Rao and Wu 2001) . Although it is understandable that such algorithms would galvanize philosophers to see in them the long sought for solution to core problems of induction, what is really needed is a scrutiny of the epistemic credentials of these procedures by both statisticians and philosophers.
The main aim of this paper is to revisit the curve fitting problem using the reliability of inductive inference as a primary criterion for the 'fittest' curve. Viewed from this perspective, it is argued that a crucial concern with the current framework for addressing the curve fitting problem is, on the one hand, the undue influence of the mathematical approximation perspective, and on the other, the insufficient attention paid to the statistical modeling aspects of the problem. Using goodness-of-fit as the primary guiding criterion, the mathematical approximation perspective undermines the reliability of inference objective by giving rise to selection rules which pay insufficient attention to 'accounting for the regularities in the data'. It is argued that high goodness-of-fit, however tempered, is neither necessary nor sufficient for reliable inference. A more appropriate framework is offered by the error-statistical approach (Mayo 1996) , where (i) statistical adequacy provides the criterion for assessing when a curve accounts for the regularities in the data adequately, and (ii) the relevant error probabilities can be used to assess the reliability of inductive inference.
Broadly speaking, the fittest curve (statistically adequate) is not determined by the smallness if its residuals, tempered by simplicity or other pragmatic criteria, but by the nonsystematic (e.g. white noise) nature of its residuals. The advocated error-statistical arguments are illustrated by comparing the Kepler and Ptolemaic models on empirical grounds, showing that the former is statistically adequate but the latter is not. Indeed, the Ptolemaic model constitutes the quintessential example of 'best' in a mathematical approximation sense, that gives rise to systematic (nonwhite noise) residuals, and thus, it does not 'save the phenomena'. Section 2 brings out the undue influence of the mathematical approximation perspective on the current discussions of the curve fitting problem. It is argued that this perspective can be both inadequate and misleading if reliable inductive inference is a primary objective. This is elaborated upon by comparing Legendre's (1805) mathematical approximation with Gauss's (1809) statistical modeling perspective, bringing out the potential conflict between 'best' in the former (goodness-of-fit), and in the latter (statistically adequate) perspective. Section 3 summarizes the basic tenets of the error-statistical approach, viewed as a modern refinement of Gauss's pioneering empirical modeling perspective, emphasizing the role of statistical adequacy as the cornerstone of reliable inductive inference. In Section 4 this perspective is used to shed light on a number of issues associated with the curve fitting problem including goodness-of-fit, predictive accuracy, projectible regularities, simplicity, overfitting and underdetermination. These arguments are illustrated by comparing the Kepler and Ptolemaic models on empirical grounds.
Mathematical Approximation vs. Statistical Modeling.

A Summary of the Curve Fitting
Problem. Curve fitting, in its simplest form, assumes that there exists a true relationship between two variables, say
X and the problem is to find an approximating curve, say , that fits g (x) m the data 'best' and ensures predictive accuracy.
The problem, as currently understood, is thought to comprise two stages. Stage 1. The choice of a family of curves, say
where , are unknown parameters and
are known functions, for example, ordinary polynomials 0, 1, . . . , m} , or even better, orthogonal poly-
nomials (Isaacson and Keller 1994) .
Stage 2.
The selection of the 'best' fitting curve within (2) using a certain goodness-of-fit criterion. Least squares (LS), which choosesĝ (x ; a ) m k LS by minimizing the sum of squares of the errors
is the preferred method, yielding the LS estimator of and minimum a a LŜ ᐉ(a ).
LS
A crucial problem with the above approximation argument is that goodness-of-fit cannot be the sole criterion for 'best', because can be made ᐉ(a) arbitrarily small by choosing m large enough, giving rise to overfitting. Indeed, as the argument goes, one can render the approximation error zero ( ) by choosing (Isaacson and Keller 1994) .
Viewing the curve fitting problem in terms of the two stages described above is largely the result of (inadvertently) imposing a mathematical approximation perspective on the problem. The choice of a 'best' curve by minimizing in (3) 
provides a mathematical solution to the problem in the sense that the error of approximation, , converges to zero on
The convergence in (5), known as convergence in the mean, implies that for every there exists a large enough integer such that:
k kp1 One can achieve a stronger form of convergence, known as uniform convergence, by imposing additional smoothness restrictions on , say, h(x) continuous second derivatives (Isaacson and Keller 1994) . This ensures that for as given above
The driving force behind the results (4)- (7) is the maximization of a goodness-of-fit criterion, or equivalently, the minimization of a norm whose general form is
for (6), and for (7). These are well-known results in
What is less well known, or appreciated enough, is that there is nothing in the above approximation results which prevents the residuals(x , m) k p
, from varying systematically with and a, b] with alternating changes in sign at least times over the interval m ϩ 2 . (See Isaacson and Keller 1994.) [a, b] Two things stand out from this theorem. First, the a priori nature of the smoothness conditions on renders them unverifiable. Second, the h(x) if and only if condition almost guarantees that the residuals would usually contain systematic information; the presence of cycles ( changes in m ϩ 2 sign, m being the degree of the fitted polynomial) in the residuals , indicates dependence over k (Spanos 1999, 215) .
A typical plot of such systematic residuals is given in Figure 3 (in Section 4) exhibiting such cycles. The systematic nature of these residuals is clearly brought out by comparing Figure 3 to Figure 4 , which represents a typical realization of nonsystematic (normal, white noise) residuals; these intuitive notions are made precise in Section 3.
To get some idea as to how the mathematical approximation error term varies systematically with , consider the case of the Lagrange inter-
defined on a net of points , and the
a smooth enough function -derivatives up to order exist-the h(x) m ϩ 1 error takes the form
that is, is an degree polynomial in x over with roots
( 1 1 )
Such an oscillating curve is also typical for errors arising from least squares approximations (Dahliquist and Bjorck 1974, 100) . In summary, a mathematical approximation method will yield a 'best' curve , but the results in (5)- (7), provide insufficient inforg (x ; a ) m k LS mation for assessing either (i) its statistical appropriateness or (ii) the reliability of any inference based on it; as argued below, the two are interrelated. Typically, the approximation residuals{ (x , m) p y Ϫ k k will vary systematically with x and m as in (11),
Mathematical vs. Probabilistic Convergence.
A problem with the current understanding of the curve fitting problem arises when the convergence results in (5)- (7) are (unwittingly) conflated with probabilistic convergence needed to establish asymptotic properties for , such aŝ a LS consistency. The former are based on , m being the degree of the m r ϱ approximating polynomial , but the latter are associated with the g (x; a) m sample size . n r ϱ Conflating these two convergence results is best exemplified by the argument that in curve fitting one can always choose the degree m of to be one less than the number of observations ( ,
rendering the approximation error zero. Although such a choice is perfectly legitimate from the mathematical approximation perspective, it is statistically meaningless, because it will yield estimated coefficients m ϩ 1 which are inconsistent estimators ofˆˆâ :p (a , a , . . . , a ) a :p
; there is one observation for each parameter! This brings (a , a , . . . , a ) 0 1 m out the highly misleading nature of the argument that one can just fit an infinite number of curves through the n data points {(x , y ), k p k k that can be 'equally consistent with the data'. Nothing can be 1, . . . , n} further from the truth; any curve that passes through all, or even most, of these points will be estimating nothing statistically meaningful-some feature of a statistical model, such as a parameter or a moment. It is no wonder that the curve fitting problem cannot be addressed in such a mathematical approximation frame-up. In practice, for inductive inference purposes one needs at least consistent estimators of , and that requires a m fixed and n to be much larger than m.
Having said that, a consistent estimator for is necessary but not a sufficient for reliable inductive inference (Cox and Hinkley 1974) . In frequentist statistics, one needs error probabilities to assesses the reliability of inference, and neither (5)- (7), nor just a consistent estimator, would provide that. What is missing is a certain probabilistic structure stating the circumstances under which would not vary systematically with (x , m) k and m, and giving rise to a sampling distribution for ; even securinĝ k, x a LS consistency necessitates that as .
Gauss's (1809) path breaking contribution was to provide such a probabilistic structure by embedding the mathematical approximation formulation into a statistical model. He achieved that by transforming the approximation error term
into a generic (free of and m) statistical error: 
What makes his contribution all important from today's vantage point is that the statistical model in (14) provides the probabilistic framework which enables one (i) to assess the validity (statistical adequacy) of the premises for inductive inference, and (ii) to provide relevant error probabilities for assessing the reliability of inference. Indeed, (i) enables one to operationalize when a curve 'captures the regularities in thê g (x; a) m data' adequately.
Broadly speaking, is 'fittest' when the residualsĝ (x; a)
izing statistical adequacy, however, is ambiguous because (a) there are numerous ways one can define 'nonsystematic' probabilistically, and (b) securing statistical adequacy by focusing on the error assumptions (e.g., ), usually provides an incomplete picture of the task (see
Spanos 2000 on 'veiled' assumptions). This facet of empirical modeling has, unfortunately, received inadequate attention in the traditional statistics literature, but it constitutes one of the basic tenets of the errorstatistical approach in the context of which the ambiguities (a)-(b) are clarified.
The Error-Statistical Approach: A Summary.
The term 'Error-Statistical' was coined by Mayo (1996) to denote a modification and extension of the framework for frequentist inductive inference, usually associated with Fisher, Neyman and Pearson. The rationale for coining this new term was to identify a collection of fundamental ideas and concepts associated with these frequentist approaches, quite apart from their philosophical differences, revolving around the central axis of being able to calculate and use error probabilities to assess the reliability of inference.
Since it is precisely this key recognition that will allow me to identify the criteria that I argue need to be satisfied, I will employ this notion throughout, understanding that it is the rationale and the difference in emphasis, and not the methods and procedures themselves, that may differ from the traditional discussions. Modifications and extensions identifying the error-statistical approach are:
i. Emphasizing the learning from data (about the phenomenon of interest) objective of empirical modeling. ii. Paying due attention to the validity of the premises of induction by securing statistical adequacy, using thorough misspecification testing and respecification. iii. Emphasizing the central role of error probabilities in assessing the reliability of inference, both pre-data as well as post-data.
iv. Supplementing the original Neyman-Pearson framework with a post-data assessment of inference in the form of severity evaluations (Mayo 1991) . v. Bridging the gap between theory and data using a sequence of interconnected models, theory (primary), structural (experimental), statistical (data) built on two different, but related, sources of information: substantive subject matter and statistical information (chance regularity patterns; see Spanos 1999). vi. Encouraging thorough probing of the different ways an inductive inference might be in error, by localizing the error probe in the context of the different models in (v); see Mayo 1996.
Embedding a Structural Model into a Statistical Model.
In the curve fitting problem, the approximating function provides an
whose form is suggested by some substantive subject matter information, including mathematical approximation theory. In this section, the problem of embedding a structural model into a statistical model is discussed in broader generality, in an attempt to shed further light on the problems and issues raised by the dependence of the error on and m.
In postulating a theory model to explain the behavior of an observable variable, say , one demarcates the segment of reality to be modeled by y k selecting the primary influencing factors , well aware that there might x k be numerous other potentially relevant factors (observable and unoby k servable) influencing the behavior of . This reasoning is captured by a y k generic theory model of the form
Indeed, the potential presence of explains the invocation of ceteris y k paribus clauses. The guiding principle in selecting the variables in is to x k ensure that they collectively account for the systematic behavior of and y k the omitted factors represent nonessential disturbing influences, which y k have only a nonsystematic effect on . This line of reasoning transforms y k the theory model (15) into a structural (estimable) model of the form
where denotes the postulated functional form, stands for the struch(7) f tural parameters of interest. The structural error term, defined to represent all unmodeled influences,
is viewed as a function of both and . For (17) to provide a meaningful x y k k model for the error term needs to be nonsystematic, say a white noise y k stochastic process satisfying the probabilistic assump{e(x , y ), k ‫}ގ‬ k k tions: Fisher 1935 ). The objective is to transform the structural error into a generic (zero mean) IID error process by applying controls and experimental design techniques:
This embeds the structural model (16) into a statistical model of the form 
model (see Spanos 1986 , Chapter 18).
Observational Data.
When the observed data {z :p (y , x ), k p t k k are the result of an ongoing actual data generating process, the 1, . . . , n} experimental control and intervention are replaced by judicious conditioning on an appropriate conditioning information set, , to transform ᑞ t the structural error into a generic martingale difference error: 
Statistical Induction and the Validity of Its Premises.
A statistical model, denoted by (see Table 1 adequacy is tantamount to the claim that data constitute a 'truly typical y 0 realization' of the stochastic mechanism described by . In practice, M (y) v statistical adequacy is assessed using thorough Misspecification (M-S) testing: probing for departures from the probabilistic assumptions comprising vis-à-vis data (Spanos 1999) .
An important provision of the error-statistical approach for securing statistical adequacy is the specification of a statistical model in terms of a complete set of probabilistic assumptions [1] -[5] (see Table 1 ) pertaining to the observable stochastic process (Spanos 2000) .
This proviso is designed to deal with the ambiguity of defining statistical adequacy in terms of nonsystematic residuals. For instance, the assumptions [1]-[5] define precisely what is meant by 'nonsystematic', and also provide a unequivocal way to secure statistical adequacy by rendering all model assumptions directly empirically testable. Statistical model specifications in terms of error assumptions are often incomplete, and the assumptions are not directly verifiable because the error process is unobservable. For instance, the error assumptions { , k ‫}ޔ‬ 
In addition, this way of specifying statistical models obviates the need to invoke a priori presuppositions like the 'uniformity of nature' (Salmon 1967) . Indeed, the invariant features of the phenomenon of interest are reflected in the t-invariant parameters (see assumption [5] ), rendering it empirically verifiable vis-à-vis data . y 0 It is well known in statistics that the reliability of any inference procedure (estimation, testing and prediction) depends crucially on the validity of the premises. Taking the latter as given, the optimality of inference procedures in frequentist statistics is defined in terms of their capacity to give rise to valid inferences, which is assessed in terms of the associated error probabilities, that is, how often these procedures lead to erroneous inferences (Mayo 1996) . In frequentist statistics, the unreliability of inference is reflected in the difference between the nominal error probabilities, derived under the assumption of valid premises, and the actual error probabilities, derived by taking into consideration the departure(s) from the model assumptions.
The Error-Statistical Approach and Curve Fitting.
In the context of the error-statistical approach the fittest curve is the one that, when g (x ; a) m k embedded in a statistical model, turns out to be statistical adequate: its probabilistic assumptions (Table 1) are valid for the data in question. The validity of these assumptions operationalizes when a curve captures the 'regularities' in the data and formalizes the intuitive notion of the residuals containing systematic information.
The reliability of inference in the context of the error-statistical approach is achievable because (i) the premises of inductive inference are rendered empirically testable, and (ii) statistically adequate premises ensure that the nominal error probabilities approximate closely the actual error probabilities (Spanos and McGuirk 2001) .
Adopting the statistical adequacy criterion for the choice of the fittest curve addresses the reliability of inference problem, but also elucidates several issues associated with the curve fitting problem, including goodness-of-fit, predictive accuracy, simplicity, overfitting and underdetermination. In principle, statistical adequacy provides a much more stringent criterion for choosing the fittest curve than the traditional tradeoff between goodness-of-fit and simplicity because it requires one to test thoroughly all model assumptions and detect no departures. Securing statistical adequacy is often a daunting task, because probabilistic assumptions such as the t-invariance of the statistical parameters (see [5] in Table 1) are particularly difficult to satisfy in practice (Spanos 1999) .
High degree of goodness-of-fit is neither necessary nor sufficient for statistical adequacy, although some degree of fit is desirable for the precision (not the reliability) of inference. On the other hand, statistical adequacy is necessary for goodness-of-fit measures, such as the and the 2 R estimated log-likelihood function , to be statistically meaningful ln L(v; y ) 0 (Spanos 2000) . Viewing predictive accuracy in terms of 'small' prediction error is nothing more than goodness-of-fit projected beyond the observation period. As such, it suffers from the same weaknesses: prediction errors, like the residuals, can vary systematically over the prediction period.
A statistically adequate curve captures all the systematic (reg (x; a) m curring) information in the data, and it gives rise to nonsystematic prediction errors. Indeed, such a curve determines what regularities in the data are projectible (Skyrms 2000) , because the model assumptions capture precisely such recurring regularities from three broad categories: distributional, dependence, and heterogeneity (Spanos 1999) . A statistically adequate model will give rise to systematic prediction errors only when the invariant structure of the underlying data generating process change between the observation and prediction periods. In such a case, one can use this very discrepancy to diagnose changes in the invariance structure. In contrast, a statistically inadequate curve is likely to overpredict g (x; a) m or underpredict, rendering it weak on predictive grounds. This is contrary to the traditional view, which usually invokes simplicity as the way to ensure predictive accuracy by counterbalancing the danger of overfitting.
What is the role of simplicity in the context of the error-statistical approach? The approximating function is chosen to be as elabg (x; a) m orate as necessary to ensure statistical adequacy, but no more elaborate. This is in the spirit of Einstein's 1933 often paraphrased comment that "it is the grand object of all theory to make these irreducible elements as simple and as few in number as possible, without having to renounce the adequate representation of any empirical content whatever" (see Einstein 1954, 272) .
A simple but statistically misspecified model is of little value for inference purposes, because its inadequacy will give rise to unreliable inferences; the nominal and actual error probabilities will differ. A simple model, however, might be of some value in probing for possible misspecifications and using the results to respecify.
Statistical adequacy provides an effective safeguard against overfitting. Overfitting, such as the unnecessary inclusion of higher degree polynomials, or additional lags, is likely to give rise to systematic residuals (Spanos 1986, 479) . One can guard against such overfitting by thorough M-S testing (Mayo and Spanos 2004) .
In a related paper, Spanos (2006c) argues that the AIC-type model selection procedures constitute a modest variation on the mathematical approximation frame-up with the norm (goodness-of-fit measure) defined byÂ IC p Ϫ2 ln L(v; y ) ϩ 2(the number of unknown parameters in v).
(22)
Despite the fact that the likelihood function presupposes a certain probabilistic structure, the capacity of AIC-type procedures to ensure the reliability of inference is severely impaired, because these probabilistic assumptions are taken at face value; their validity is not assessed. Indeed, assessing the validity of these assumptions to secure statistical adequacy, would render these model selection procedures redundant; finding a statistically adequate model determines the fittest curve. Be that as it may, when these procedures are viewed in the context of the above discusssion, they raise two distinct concerns: (a) they require starting with a family of models assumed to contain the correct model, without supplying any criteria for model validation; and (b) even within an assumed family of models, satisfying AIC-type criteria does not ensure fulfilling requirements of low error probabilities for any inferences reached. When the fittest curve is selected on statistical adequacy grounds it becomes clear that the problem of underdetermination is unlikely to be as pervasive as often claimed. Indeed, finding a single statistically adequate model for a particular data is often a daunting task, because probabilistic assumptions such as the t-invariance of the statistical parameters ([5] in Table 1 ), are particularly difficult to satisfy in practice (Spanos 1999) . Empirical equivalence on statistical adequacy grounds is rare but possible, raising the prospect of comparing such models using additional criteria including substantive adequacy: the validity of the structural model (confounding factors, causal claims, external validity, etc.) vis-à-vis the phenomenon of interest. As argued in Spanos 2006b, statistical adequacy is necessary, but not sufficient, for ensuring substantive adequacy. To exemplify the above error-statistical assertions, two widely discussed models of planetary motion, Kepler's and Ptolemy's, are compared on empirical grounds.
Kepler's Model of Planetary Motion.
Kepler's model for the elliptical motion of Mars turned out to be a real empirical regularity because the statistical model, in the context of which the structural model was embedded, can be shown to be statistically adequate.
Consider Kepler's first law of motion in the form of the structural model where , , the distance of the planet from the sun, y :p (1/r) x :p cos c r p and the angle between the line joining the sun and the planet and c p the principal axis of the ellipse (see Figure 1) .
It is important to emphasize that historically this law was originally proposed by Kepler as just an empirical regularity that he 'deduced' from Brahe's data. Newton provided a structural interpretation to Kepler's first law using his law of universal gravitation , where F is shortest distance between the planet and the sun. Moreover, the error term also enjoys a structural interpretation e(x , y ) k k in the form of 'deviations' from the elliptic motion due to potential measurement errors as well as other unmodeled effects. Hence, the white noise error assumptions [i]- [iv] in (18) will be inappropriate in cases where (i) the data suffer from 'systematic' observation errors; (ii) the third body problem effect is significant; and (iii) the general relativity terms turn out to be important. Embedding (23) into the Normal/Linear Regression model (Table 1) , and estimating it using Kepler's original data ( ) yields n p 28 
The misspecification tests (Spanos and McGuirk 2001) reported in Table  2 indicate that the estimated model is statistically adequate; the p-values in square brackets indicate no significant departure from assumptions [1]-[5] . A less formal but more intuitive verification of the statistical adequacy A cursory look at the standardized residuals ( Figure 3 ) confirms the excellent goodness-of-fit ( )-none of the residuals lies outside 2 R p 0.992 an interval of 2.5 standard deviations. Despite being relatively small, a closer look reveals that the residuals exhibit systematic statistical information. The cycles exhibited by the residuals plot reflect a departure from the independence assumption (Spanos 1999, Chapter 5) . These patterns are discernible using analogical reasoning based on comparing Figure 3 with a t-plot of a typical (zero mean) NIID realization given in Figure 4 . It is interesting to note that Babb's (1977) plot of the residuals from the Ptolemy model for Mars, ordered according to the angle of observation , looks very similar to Figure 3 .
The various departures from assumptions [1]-[5] are formally exposed using the misspecification tests shown in Table 3 . The tiny p-values in square brackets indicate strong departures from all the statistical assumptions-the estimated Ptolemy model is seriously statistically misspecified.
The Ptolemaic model has been widely praised as yielding highly accurate predictions. To assess that claim, the estimated model in (26) was used to predict the next 13 observations (688-700). On the basis of Theil's coefficient, where is the actual value and is the predicted value. Its predictivê y y t t accuracy seems excellent: , the closer to zero the better-see 0 ≤ U ≤ 1 Spanos 1986, 405. However, the plot of the actual and fitted values in Figure 5 reveals a different picture: the predictive accuracy of the Ptol- emaic model is problematic since it underpredicts systematically, a symptom of statistical inadequacy.
The discussion in Section 2 explains the above empirical results associated with the Ptolemaic model as a classic example of how curve fitting, as a mathematical approximation method, would usually give rise to systematic residuals (and prediction errors), irrespective of the goodness-offit. In this case, the use of epicycles is tantamount to approximating a periodic function using orthogonal trigonometric polynomials; that h(x) is, takes the general form (Isaacson and Keller 1994) g (x; v) 
As first noted by Bohr (1949) , every additional epicycle increases m to . m ϩ 1 5. Summary and Conclusions. The current perspective dominating discussions on curve fitting is that of mathematical approximation theory, which provides an inadequate framework for reliable inductive inference. In particular, it provides no adequate basis for (i) testable assumptions to ensure the validity of the premises for inductive inference and (ii) dependably ascertainable error probabilities to assess the reliability of inference. Both (i) and (ii) are attainable in the context of the error-statistical approach, by embedding the approximation problem into a statistical model, , whose premises are empirically testable, and selecting the 'fittest' M (y) v curve to be one that gives rise to a statistically adequate modelg (x; v) m its probabilistic assumptions are valid for the data in question-formalizing the conditions under which the fitted curve captures the 'regularities' in data, , adequately. These error-statistical assertions are affirmed by y 0 demonstrating that Kepler's law of planetary motion gives rise to a statistically adequate model, but Ptolemy's epicycles model does not. Indeed, the latter constitutes an example of a 'best' curve, in a mathematical approximation sense, that does not account for the regularities in the data; it yields systematic residuals.
